Federal agencies would coordinate allied work on minerals, technology, and shipbuilding

State Department officials would run critical-mineral partnerships and related science-and-technology aid. The Trade and Development Agency could support specified projects and use additional staffing options. Mineral partners could include selected countries and eligible research, education, nonprofit, or business groups, but not countries or foreign entities treated as security concerns. Related aid could go to eligible allied or partner countries or organizations. Each mineral partnership would need goals, assigned duties, progress measures, and a multiyear plan. At least 30 days before entering one, the State Department would notify and consult Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs and give both an in-person briefing. The mineral program could use grants and cooperative agreements, international research centers, and a public website for opportunities and project proposals. The State Department could acquire, hold, operate, lease, sell, or otherwise dispose of property, ownership stakes, mineral rights, infrastructure, and facilities abroad or, after consulting the General Services Administration, in the United States. Acquisitions would follow applicable law and, when appropriate, have the host government's consent or cooperation. Proceeds from disposing of acquired assets could be used for purposes authorized by Title I or held in a revolving fund and remain available until expended. Title I authorities would end seven years after enactment. Earlier agreements and closeout work could continue, and funds committed before that date could still be spent for their original purposes.

The State Department would run an overseas manufacturing training exchange for selected U.S. citizens. Applicants would need qualifying apprenticeship, trade-school, vocational-school, or college preparation and the needed language skills or a plan to gain them. Placements would be at approved manufacturers or institutions in allied or partner countries. Officials would select no more than 10 people each year and approve each placement and work plan. Each person would receive a stipend for reasonable program costs, which could include living, travel, training, health care, and other approved expenses. Participants would complete orientation, coursework or practical training, professional development, and hands-on work. They would track and share what they learned as much as possible. One stated purpose is to avoid subsidizing companies by paying to train people affiliated with or holding a minority interest in a U.S. company that has a subsidiary in the host country. Each placement could last up to 12 months, with one renewal of up to six months. The program would end December 31, 2029.

The State Department would publish recurring lists of certain China-linked mining operations. Listings would cover China-linked entities and mining sites in named or other African countries when the State Department reasonably finds that mining of critical minerals, gold, or iron uses forced labor or forced child labor, or harms protected areas. Officials would use public information and information gathered by U.S. embassies. They would also consult federal agencies and foreign counterparts. The public list would be unclassified, although the version sent to Congress could include a classified attachment. Lists would be issued at least once each year during the two-year period beginning on enactment.

The State Department could run a program helping approved governments and international organizations obtain trusted cyber and digital technology. Partners could be approved governments or international organizations, excluding countries treated as security concerns. Covered products could include software, hardware, cybersecurity tools, telecommunications equipment, and artificial-intelligence tools. To qualify as trusted, technology could not come from a provider, supplier, or maker owned, controlled, or influenced by a country treated as a security concern. It also could not pose an unacceptable U.S. security risk. Program funds could support civilian agencies. Police or military agencies could receive funds only when they own and operate the partner's civilian critical infrastructure. Funds could not go to countries treated as security concerns or to countries, people, or organizations covered by specified sanctions or federal restriction lists. Before approving a partnership, the State Department should assess misuse and diversion risks, set safeguards based on those risks, include tracking of how technology is used, and consult intelligence and defense officials. It should seek suitable partner cost sharing where practicable. Any program would end seven years after enactment. Reports to Congress would start within one year after enactment and continue annually for two more years.

Federal officials would pursue allied shipbuilding and maritime policies, investigate shipping practices, and assign water, environmental, maritime, and space duties to a State Department assistant secretary and bureau. The shipbuilding policy would cover supply chains for commercial and military ships. Allied work would involve selected countries; the Maritime Group could include key shipping countries but not countries treated as security concerns. The shipbuilding policy calls for U.S. worker training, allied investment in U.S. shipyards, and a long-term plan to diversify supply chains. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation's authority would expressly include harbors, ports, and related infrastructure. The State Department would post investigators in countries among the five largest open ship registries and the top 15 on at least two measures: shipbuilding, merchant mariners, or large commercial fleets. They would examine unfair shipping, denied port access, lower standards, anticompetitive deals, and China-linked finances. Officials would brief and report on the China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy Industry and China State Shipbuilding Corporation, including subsidiaries, business practices, government ties, and shipyards that may support China's navy. An international exchange could host marine engineers, shipyard managers, skilled tradespeople, and other shipbuilding experts. At enactment, the current officeholder would take the renamed role. Shipbuilding-expert exchanges would be authorized for two years. The Chinese shipbuilder briefing and first report would be due within one year, with annual reports for two more years.