Alaska would check voter records and allow ballot signature fixes

The Alaska Division of Elections would review voter records and conduct annual audits with a nationally recognized outside expert. Reviews would check deaths, voting eligibility, registration in other states, and voter-data breaches. Address notices would go by forwardable mail and email, if available. Address notices would cover returned election mail in the preceding two years, no contact for two years combined with no voting or appearance to vote for 28 months, or listed signs of residence elsewhere during the preceding 28 months. Officials could skip notices based on activity elsewhere when they reasonably determine that the voter is lawfully away from Alaska. Applying for a Permanent Fund Dividend would not count as contacting election officials unless it is the voter's initial registration. Address checks would occur at least each January. Cancellation would follow the second general election after inactivation without contact or voting; notices separately describe a 34-month window. Audit reports would be due each April 1.

Election officials would provide prepaid absentee return envelopes, free online ballot tracking, and signature checks using comparison software. Tracking would show ballot delivery, receipt, and counting status and let voters submit correction information. Covered overseas ballots must be mailed by election day and received by close of business on the 10th day afterward, except under a separate statutory rule. Voters with no stored signature, a missing ballot signature, or a mismatched signature would need to confirm returning the ballot, provide accepted identification and a signature, and return the correction form within 14 days after election day. The ballot must otherwise be valid. If a voter denies returning the ballot or misses the correction deadline, the ballot would not count. Officials would send available signature copies to the attorney general for investigation. Officials could not find a mismatch solely because a voter used initials or a common nickname. Officials comparing signatures would receive training. Tracking would require multiple identity checks at login. An outside supplier must be a corporation incorporated in the United States. Signature checks, tracking, and correction rules would take effect June 1, 2027, if enacted. Certificate reviews would begin at least 12 days before election day. Correction notices would be sent within 48 hours, but no later than two days after election day.

Election officials would apply the listed identification rules, employ a rural voting liaison, and count presidential write-in votes under stated rules. Identification rules would cover registration, in-person voting, and specified first-time absentee voters. Officials would also recommend early voting options for rural communities and neighborhoods below 80 percent of statewide median family income. Accepted documents would include photo identification, birth certificates, passports, and federally recognized tribal identification cards. The lists would exclude hunting licenses, fishing licenses, and household bills. Registration officials could waive identification for applicants they know. Ballot-review rules would retain specified exceptions based on personal knowledge, identification waivers, or identifying numbers. Presidential write-in candidates would need to file a certification letter. A vote would require a filled oval and an accepted name; the presidential candidate's last name alone could qualify. The rural liaison would work with tribes and municipalities on absentee voting, early voting where available, and adequate polling-place staffing. These provisions would take effect immediately if enacted. The early voting report would be due by the first day of the 35th Alaska Legislature's first regular session.

Election officials would report voter-list checks, ballot counts, and data breaches. Election crime provisions would cover intentional ballot or system tampering and certain early disclosures. Revenue officials would share dividend applicant records monthly and secure them. Counting reports would show which ballots were counted. Election officials would commit misconduct by knowingly sharing results or confidential election data with nonofficials before polls close. Permanent Fund Dividend information could be used only for voter registration and voter-list maintenance. Disclosure of confidential revenue information would be barred except under a referenced statutory exception. Confidential voter records shared for outside reviews must be encrypted. Recipients must use them only to help with the review and agree not to retain or pass them along. Public breach notices could be delayed when investigators say disclosure would compromise an ongoing investigation. The ballot-tampering rule would cover intentional opening or tampering without express authorization from the election director. The system rule would cover intentional hacking or tampering with election equipment or software. If enacted, these rules would take effect immediately. Counting reports would accompany daily results or ballot reviews. Breach deadlines would depend on election timing. Crime provisions would apply to offenses committed on or after their effective date.

Campaign rules would define who counts as the source of money used to influence ballot questions or candidate elections. For ballot questions, the source would be whoever makes the contribution or independent spending. For candidates, it would generally be whoever supplies money from earnings, investments, inheritance, or sales. For candidate elections, someone passing along contributions, donations, dues, or gifts would generally be an intermediary rather than the money's source. A membership organization receiving dues or contributions of less than $2,000 per person per year would itself count as the source. The contribution-source definition would take effect January 1, 2027, if enacted.